focus of this book) and this is where his strength lies; a grounded approach to local intra-Islamic debates about the meaning of Pakistan in the United Provinces in the 1940s is surely welcome.

Yet Dhulipala overstates his case in his answer and, in his determination to pin down a singular new kind of orthodoxy, misses the chance to make a more subtle reading of his material. A core argument is that “Pakistan was popularly imagined in U.P. [Uttar Pradesh] as a sovereign Islamic state” (4). But can this statement really be judged as one of “the most decisive arguments for creating Pakistan” (4)? This evidence cannot sustain such grandiose claims about the origins and causes of the creation of the state. There are far more contradictory—and therefore intriguing—snippets of information in this book than the argument belies.

Consequently, this book is curiously uninformed by the rich historiographical debates about the meanings of religious nationalism in South Asia that have animated work over the past thirty years. Dhulipala in the introduction uses “religious beliefs,” “piety,” and “theology” (11) almost interchangeably without exploring their separate and different meanings. Ayesha Jalal—whom Dhulipala self-consciously pits himself against—has spent much of her recent time explaining just these complexities in South Asian Islamic thought. Dhulipala uses phrases such as “Islamic state,” “Pan-Islamism,” “state,” “nation,” “sovereignty,” and “self-government” here, sometimes interchangeably, with a degree of literalism that was far from clear to those speaking or writing at the time. Did invoking freedom really directly translate into envisaging completely independent nations at a time when no British Asian or African colony anywhere in the world had achieved full sovereign independence? For instance, the direct translation of the word azad to independence (292) can mask as well as elucidate the multiple meanings of words being used at the time. In the 1940s, Mahatma Gandhi’s swaraj (self-rule) had multiple meanings, and resonated with some proponents of Hindu nationalism. The Congress Party was also being endorsed by fatwas and mosques up and down the land. This is a two-sided story then, and it is hard to tell the story of the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh in isolation from the rest of society. The role of the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) and killings of Muslims at massacres like Garhmuakar in 1946, appear tacked into the epilogue, as if they follow as a consequence from the Muslim League’s actions rather than as part of a dynamic political action by multiple parties in the 1940s.

The strength of the appeal of Pakistan was in its evocation of many contradictory ideals, from utopian dreams to hard material calculus. Also the power of the demand for Pakistan was to catalyze alliances along a spectrum ranging from religious conservatives to communists. The book only deals with events in the United Provinces, a province where Muslims made up about a fifth of the population. The real tensions that beset the Muslim majority and minority provinces, and how Muhammad Ali Jinnah tried to wield a pan-Indian coalition among these different groups, are at the heart of the problem of Indian constitution making in the 1940s but are left aside here.

Likewise, the paraphrasing of primary sources and blow-by-blow readings of texts lead to very literal interpretations. Some of Dhulipala’s own evidence flies in the face of his conclusions and suggests rather that these differences are embedded within Pakistani nationalism. A staple of the historiography is to show the internal differences within Muslim and Hindu groups. As many studies of places from Turkey, Israel, India, and other modern nationalist movements make clear, nationalism and religion have a complex relationship, are historically constituted, and cannot simply be equated with each other. Nor—as even the recent case of Scotland shows—can the explanation of nationalism be easily boiled down to one or two ideas. It is the complexities embedded within nationalist movements that are important for historians.

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In six thematic and chronologically organized chapters, Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since Independence traces the relationship of the Indian army and nation through the course of the long twentieth century. Following along the well-trodden tracks made by Stephen P. Cohen, Ayesha Jalal, Daniel P. Marston, and Donald Horowitz, Steven I. Wilkinson examines reforms in the military by contextualizing them within the broader ambit of civilian politics. This allows him to argue that, despite having common colonial origins, the Indian and Pakistani armies had such different trajectories because their civilian leaders made very different choices in the crucial first few decades after independence.

Beginning with the period after the great rebellion of 1857, Wilkinson sifts through numerous army reports as well as secret correspondence between British officers in India and the India Office in London to show how the steady “martialization” of the Indian army remained fairly unchanged from the 1880s through the Second World War. Preparing the Indian army for a possible war with the Russians meant insisting on very high standards; these, the British believed, could only be met by recruiting from certain groups of people deemed to possess “martial” characteristics. This pattern of recruitment stayed fairly firm despite increasingly strident calls for reform from Indian nationalists, especially from the 1920s onward.

Wilkinson follows the evidence on army reform closely to track the shifting relationship between ideas, debates, and practice. Thus we learn that Nirad C. Chaudhuri’s articles and policy papers and Indian National Congress resolutions from the 1930s did lead to clear changes in the relationship between the army
and the political class in free India. They included: downgrading the position of the army Commander-in-Chief to that of Chief of Army Staff, equal to the other service chiefs; increasing the number of recruitment streams to the army; and opening up recruitment at the officer level to different ethnic groups to make the officers less ethnically cohesive (a point of comparison particularly useful for understanding the difference with Pakistan). At the same time, despite the flurry of pronouncements of reforms in the composition of the army, changes on the ground were few and far between. Demonstrating that history could, in some instances, be fairly easily replicated, Wilkinson shows how strategies deployed by the British to counter the demands of Indian nationalists to broaden the composition of the army were later used by India’s leaders to resist similar demands from regional and caste leaders. The newly independent Indian army continued to draw its frontline combat troops from the “martial” classes even as senior army officers played up the few units that were recruited from nontraditional groups and regions, and promised that the army did not discriminate along lines of religion, region, or caste in its recruitment.

On the question of whether India moved from a federal structure to a stronger center after the Partition of India, Wilkinson’s book leans toward the more federal side of the debate. Drawing upon Stephen P. Cohen’s interviews with senior politicians in the early 1960s, as well as on the fact that Nehru had to eventually give way to regional leaders on the question of a national language, Wilkinson concludes that India’s “genuine federal structure with multiple poles of authority . . . made it much harder for the military to seize power quickly” (120).

Well-chosen details from a rich gamut of sources make Army and Nation a memorable read. For example, to prove that there was “no great difference in political outlook” between Indian and Pakistani generals who had trained in the same military academies before Partition, Wilkinson provides this telling anecdote: “When Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph interviewed General [J. N.] Chaudhuri in February 1963 and asked him about his former Sandhurst batchmate Ayub Khan’s 1958 coup in Pakistan, ‘He said that he thought what must have happened was that Ayub Khan, finding Iskander Mirza playing ducks and drakes with the political situation in Pakistan had felt obliged to move in and ‘put things right’” (125).

Yet, all is not well with the seemingly apolitical Indian army. Bringing this history to reflect on very recent events, Wilkinson shows that the pressures of coalition politics and the resurgence of caste politics has led to new pressures on the military and political leadership of India. Also, the old mantra of insulating the army from politics has become muted as units of the army have been used for counterinsurgency purposes in Kashmir and the northeast. Furthermore, the conservative army leadership has intervened in the political decision to continue with the very unpopular Armed Forces Special Powers Act (26, 156, 225) that grants the army judicial immunity in Kashmir and the northeast, and has been held responsible for covering up numerous human rights atrocities, as well as in the decision not to demilitarize the Siachen glacier, a decision on which the Indian and Pakistani civilian leaderships had reached agreement (27, 225).

Writing a compelling and informative book, Wilkinson has mined a very wide range of sources: army reports from the late nineteenth century onwards, recruiting handbooks, parliamentary debates, collections of published correspondence between key Indian leaders, transcripts generously provided by Cohen and the Rudolphs from their interviews with important army officers and politicians from the defense and external affairs ministries conducted in the 1960s, even Wikileaks cables. The many lines of tension between the political and the military leadership, and within both these worlds of action, make the stories that populate this book come alive.

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Negotiated Power: The State, Elites, and Local Governance in Twelfth- to Fourteenth-Century China is a welcome and important addition to our literature on the state and society in Song and Yuan China. For many decades, historians of this period—especially those in the U.S.—have debated the nature and evolution of social elites and their relationship to the state. Much of that debate has concerned the localization hypothesis proposed first by Robert Hartwell but more fully by Robert Hymes in his classic study, Statesmen and Gentlemen: The Elite of Fu-chou, Chiang-hsi, in Northern and Southern Sung (1986), and subsequently debated widely, by Beverly Bossler, Peter K. Bol, Patricia Ebrey, Lau Nap-yin, and Kondo Kazunari, to name just a few. In his study Hymes argued on the basis of Fuzhou materials that elite society underwent a sea change from the Northern Song (960–1127) to the Southern Song (1127–1279) periods, from a capital-centered elite characterized by long-distance marriage alliances, to local elites that were focused on their own localities and largely alienated from the government. In the book under review, Sukhee Lee draws on the exceptionally rich sources for the prosperous and politically successful prefecture of Mingzhou (modern Ningbo) for an understanding of how its elite evolved from the Northern to Southern Song periods and then on into the Yuan. His attention, however, is on the interactions between the elite and the local government, and this focus offers an important contribution.

In the course of four chapters, Lee examines the nature of the Mingzhou elite, its political successes and marriage patterns; the activities of the local government...