Partition and Minority Rights in Punjabi Hindu Debates, 1920-47

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The academic focus on Muslim politics in pre-Partition India has contributed to the quality “divisive” becoming almost synonymous with “Muslim”. This paper analyses the politics of Punjabi Hindus from the early 1920s onwards to suggest that their many schemes for partitioning the Punjab coexisted with demands for separate electorates and reservations for minorities. Partition, however, was not as deadly and tormented a proposal in the 1920s as it became two decades later. The critical, operative factor was safeguarding minority rights and, in striking contrast to contemporary debates in Europe, did not entail population transfers.

Foregrounding the politics of Punjabi Hindus, this essay tracks discussions around “Partition” and “minority rights” in the Punjabi public sphere. In stark contrast to the existing historiography on Partition that focuses almost entirely on the field of “Muslim” politics, my research examines the politics of “Hindus”, so defined despite being an internally differentiated community. Also, in contrast to the new subaltern turn in Partition historiography, my paper re-engages with a study of “high politics”.

A religiously defined minority in undivided Punjab and part of the majority community in India, Punjabi Hindus grappled with a variety of proposals for safeguarding their rights in the decades before Partition. Sometimes they favoured a redrawing of boundaries, both within the Punjab and all India; at all times they invested in the idea of a strong centre in the India-to-be and hoped that such a centre, with Hindus at the helm, would safeguard their minority rights in the Punjab. This is why, despite the forays of the Hindu Mahasabha in their province, and their occasional disillusionment with the politics pursued by the Indian National Congress, Punjabi Hindus put their faith in a Congress that, howsoever weak within the Punjab, was clearly going to inherit power at the centre in Delhi.

However, when the Congress appeared to consider Jinnah's demand for what had come to be called “Pakistan” by the early 1940s, Punjab's minorities protested vehemently. Yet paradoxically, when the Congress agreed to the grouping of provinces under the 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan, an alternative that would have preserved a united India, Punjab's Hindus preferred partition over grouping. They were far more interested in preserving a strong connection to the centre that was India than they were to the province that was Punjab. In highlighting demands for partition from the early 1920s onwards, I do not mean to suggest that the Partition of 1947 was inevitable. On the contrary, I suggest that partition was not as deadly and tormented a proposal in the 1920s as it became two decades later. The meanings of “partition” changed in subsequent decades, but the critical, operative factor was always that of minority rights.

Multiple Partitions, Multiple Possibilities

A close consideration of numerous pacts and proposals fashioned between 1916 and 1947 shows that safeguarding the rights of minorities – variously defined – was an important component of these proposals. Between 28% and 32% of the population of undivided Punjab, the Hindus were a religiously defined “minority” within the province. Although divided along lines of sect,
caste, “agricultural” and “non-agricultural” tribe, and class, they were defined as a monolith for British purposes. As key players in the rest of India argued for greater reforms and varying measures of self-determination to be granted to Indians, Punjabi Hindus framed their demands similarly.

Early on, the British declared that reaching an agreement between religious communities was a prerequisite for independence. Claims to India being a nation, made by nationalists, were routinely countered by old India hands in Britain who declared that India was a land of many nations, many nationalities. As the term “nation” began to be used less loosely, it became even more necessary for the Indian National Congress to prove its representative character to critics abroad, and at home.

The first all-India pact forged between Hindus and Muslims represented by the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League was in 1916. The terms of this now famous Lucknow Pact included the Congress agreeing to the granting of separate electorates to Muslims in all provinces, including Punjab and Bengal, where they were in a majority. But the pact failed to regard Sikhs as a distinct community and did not grant Muslims, who were about 55% of the population, a statutory majority in Punjab. Instead Hindu and Sikh minorities in the Punjab were offered 50% weighted representation although they together comprised only 44% of the population. Three years later, when the next instalment of reforms granted Sikhs, who were about 12% of the population in the Punjab, a weightage of 19%, it became apparent that this weightage would have to come from the minority Hindu quota.

The 1920s have been seen as a time of growing disenchantment between Hindus and Muslims as evinced in the growth of communal riots. During one such communal riot in Kohat in 1924, a district belonging to the newly created North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Kohari Hindus were evacuated to the neighbouring Punjab city of Rawalpindi. It was in the aftermath of this particular riot that the Congress heavyweight Lala Lajpat Rai put forward his demand for a partition of the Punjab.

Lajpat Rai’s demand needs to be placed in a couple of larger contexts. First, in terms of the province, Punjabi politics were marked by acrimonious debates over the extension of separate electorates to local bodies and reservations for the backward Muslim majority in government departments and university admissions. These demands, put forward by a Unionist Ministry led by Mian Fazl-i-Husain, were presented by Punjabi Hindus who wished to maintain the status quo that had hitherto resulted in their dominance in education and government employment. Second, at the all-India level, the possible separation of Sind from Bombay Presidency, and the re-amalgamation of a few districts of the NWFP with the Punjab were major topics of discussion. Furthermore, the Congress had pledged itself to the linguistic reorganisation of provinces in 1920. No boundaries within the map of India, hitherto divided according to the vagaries of British conquest and convenience, were sacrosanct.

Boundary making, like the demand for separate electorates and reservations, became another means of safeguarding minority rights. So Gulshan Rai of Sanatan Dharm College in Lahore proposed a radical redistribution of provinces such that of the 50 provinces that could be created out of India, Muslims would dominate in nine and Hindus in 41. Rai contended that the experience of parliamentary government had clearly shown that provinces with heterogeneous populations could not pull together; indeed “the play of centrifugal forces” had been on full display. Therefore provinces needed to be divided into smaller and more homogeneous units averaging a population of 50 lakhs, and the central government had to have full control over the army, police, navy and air force.

Gulshan Rai’s views on governance in the Punjab were inseparable from his idea of India: there was no room for provincial autonomy in his vision. Also arguing for an integrated view but with a somewhat different emphasis was Raja Narendra Nath, a civil servant who went on to have a distinguished career in the Hindu Mahasabha and the Punjab Legislative Council. Presenting a “Memorandum on the Rights Claimed by Hindu Minority in North-West India” to the Simon Commission in 1928, Nath argued that the Hindus in the north-west were a minority and ought to receive all the preferential safeguards accorded to Muslim minorities in the rest of India. However, Nath was opposed to separate electorates on the principle that they deprived those outside the religious community which formed the electorate from exercising a vote in selecting representatives to whom the fate of all would be entrusted. Nath proposed that the four recently separated districts of the NWFP be re-amalgamated with the Punjab, and the Hindus therein claim rights as a minority. For this newly enhanced Punjab, Nath demanded joint electorates with reservations of seats according to the existing proportions of 50% Muslim and 50% Hindu and Sikh. Safeguarding the comparative advantage that had accrued to the Hindu community was crucial.

In the Memorandum, Nath also railed against the Muslim-majority Punjab Unionist Party’s new policy whereby the future recruitment of services in certain government departments was ordered to be in the proportion of 40% Muslims, 40% Hindus and others, and 20% Sikhs. He warned that there were no provisions to further reduce the proportions assigned to Hindus from 40% to 20%. Further he held that the claim of the Muslim majority community to reservations in government service was incompatible with its claim for provincial autonomy, “for what is now a concession to a backward community would become an irrecoverable privilege after provincial autonomy has been given”.

Nath decided to cooperate with the otherwise boycotted British-appointed Simon Commission. He explained that the official statistics collected would reveal that Punjabi Muslims were under-represented in services. Nath wished to emphasise a different set of statistics. He compared the position of Hindus in Muslim majority Punjab with Muslims in Hindu majority provinces and demanded the same privileges for minority Hindus that minority Muslims enjoyed. In conclusion, he blithely declared that communities that could not agree on issues like cow-killing and music before mosques could obviously not agree on more serious questions like the defence of a land frontier. He doubted that the Simon Commission could recommend a “long step” towards domination status for India.

Although most urban Punjabi Hindus agreed with Nath’s recommendation that the future constitution forbid discrimination
of civic rights on the basis of caste and creed, they stopped short of agreeing with him on the long-term necessity of British rule. Instead, several Punjabi Hindus led by Lajpat Rai cooperated with the Congress in the production of the 1928 Nehru Report. By the terms of the Nehru Report, there was no need to secure reservations for Muslim minorities in Punjab and Bengal. The report recommended the partition of Sind from Bombay after assessing its financial viability as a separate state, and the introduction of reforms in the NWFP. Muslim demands for one-third representation in the central legislature were dismissed as unwarranted. The report took back weighted representation and separate electorates that had been promised to Sikh and Muslim minorities in the Lucknow Pact. The only reservations permitted were for minorities in “strict proportion” to their numbers in the population. Muslim fears of the advanced economic position of Hindus in the Punjab were dismissed as “largely imaginary”. The unequal franchise that prevailed in the Punjab was noted, but did not believe to merit further attention since the report recommended adult franchise. The Hindus of Punjab and Bengal deemed to be too big to be dealt with as minorities; reserved seats were not provided for the “Depressed Classes” either. Communal representation for 10 years was considered to be a half-way compromise between the evils of separate electorates and joint electorates.

Punjabi Hindus responded to this centrist view of their predicament variously. The crown prize, arduously fought for by Lajpat Rai, and granted by the Nehru Report, was the recommendation for joint electorates. However, Bhai Parmanand, a strikingly recalcitrant Punjabi Hindu leader, argued that joint electorates would be no panacea because the Hindus, “being naturally possessed of mild and tolerant temperament” would only elect weak Hindus, while any Muslim was as “good” as the other. He declared his opposition to joint electorates as well as to separate electorates, to the introduction of reforms in Sind and NWFP, and indeed to all further negotiations with Muslims. Sangathan or, focusing on strengthening the Hindu community, rather than striving for a Hindu-Muslim settlement, was his solution to the problem of Hindu minorities in the Punjab and the north-west.

Although the Nehru Report had not offered any proposals to redraw the provincial boundaries of Punjab, such ideas were never distant. As members of the first Round Table Conference convened in London to chart out possible safeguards for minorities and majorities, in faraway Allahabad, the poet-politician Muhammad Iqbal presented a scheme for a Muslim India within India to his fellow Muslim Leaguers. Iqbal’s 1930 proposal for a “consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State” that would include the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan as the “final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India”, today regarded as a forerunner of Pakistan, was even then unappreciated by Punjab’s vocal minorities.

Iqbal’s lofty assurance that the Muslims in this state would gladly safeguard the north-west frontiers only rang alarm-bells: Why would such a Muslim state be necessary for the defence of India against foreign invaders? What of the immense seaboard? And were the martial races among Hindus and Sikhs to be ignored or converted to Islam?

However, others surveyed the alternatives. Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar, a member of the Central Sikh League and the Congress, felt that the really intractable question was that of balancing the interests of different communities within the Punjab. The Sikhs, for instance, were only 12% of the Punjab but they owned a third of the land and formed a quarter of the British Indian army. If the Muslims claimed political importance on the grounds of ruling India before the British, the Sikhs lay similar claim upon the Punjab. They also claimed weightage in the Punjab in the same proportion as did Muslims in states like the United Provinces where they were a similarly situated minority. But this would cut into the marginal majority of the Muslims and certainly into that of the Hindus. So what was the solution?

Caveeshar proposed a partition whereby western Punjab would comprise the divisions of Rawalpindi and Multan, while the eastern Punjab province would include Ambala, Jullundur and Lahore divisions. In this newly created and still substantially sized western Punjab, there would be a little over six million Muslims, 9 lakh Hindus and almost 5 lakh Sikhs. Muslims could easily afford to give the non-Muslims weightage. In the newly created eastern Punjab, there would be slightly more than 5.5 million Hindus, slightly over five million Muslims, and almost 2 lakh Sikhs. Here the Sikhs would need no weightage since neither Hindus nor Muslims would be in an absolute majority. Such a division would contain communitarian ambitions that seemed, at the time, irreconcilable and an impediment towards national unity. Caveeshar felt both provinces could have a common governor responsible to their respective legislatures as well as a common high court and a common university. "Both the provinces could be united again into one, when the communal feelings have died down in India and the national life is cleared of communal rubbish."

Bhai Parmanand was less sanguine. He treated Iqbal’s proposal for a large Muslim state, and other longstanding proposals to separate Sind from Bombay, and establish an autonomous government in Baluchistan and the NWFP as part of a larger conspiracy to create a strong “Muhammadan belt on the north-west frontier”. More crucially, Muslims appeared to want residuary powers with the federating units. Parmanand turned to John Stuart Mill’s strictures in [Considerations on] Representative Government for guidance on what might bind together a federation. He considered Mill’s examples from history – those of the German Bund and the United States – and agreed with him on the necessity for a strong federal army that would “carry the decrees of the federation against any recalcitrant state”. Residuary powers would have to lie with the centre.

It was at this moment that the Congress announced its resolution, a compromise that Gandhi admitted fell half-way between “undiluted nationalism” and “undiluted communalism”. These included joint electorates; adult franchise, or, failing that a uniform and extensive franchise that would reflect the proportion of every religious community in the electoral roll; reservations for minorities who were less than 25% of the population in
provincial and federal legislatures with the option to contest additional seats; the separation of Sind from Bombay; reforms for NWFP and Baluchistan; an assured majority to Muslims in Punjab and Bengal; the protection of culture, script, religious belief and practice, and personal law; and the vesting of residuary powers in the federating units, unless, on further examination, they proved to be against India's best interests.19

As might have been expected, Punjabis belonging to the Hindu Sabha were livid. Narendra Nath, spokesperson for minority Hindu interests in the Punjab, asked if Gandhi was aware that Hindus were a minority in 21 districts of Punjab. He alleged that the right to contest for additional seats was not a good enough substitute for the weightage that minorities had hitherto enjoyed. Unless it was possible to form constituencies in which there were a majority of voters belonging to that religious community, this right would be useless.20 Here was communal logic operating at its invidious best. Nath assumed that with joint electorate at play, Sikh, Hindu or Muslim candidates would never stand a chance from constituencies in which they were a minority. Communal considerations would always triumph over other party manifestos.

Bhai Parmanand made his objections equally explicit. Was Gandhi not aware that “statutory communal majority is the very antithesis of democratic self-government”? Parmanand preferred British rule to such a solution. He also recommended a partition:21

I would wish both Bengal and the Punjab to be partitioned into two parts, each part consisting of the Hindu majority and the Muslim majority so as to save the Hindu majority from communal domination. Secondly Mahatma Gandhi agreed to vest residuary powers in the provinces. This means the dismemberment of the country into Hindu India and Muslim India. It is a pity that Mahatma Gandhi cannot foresee the endless troubles which would result from it ... On the other hand, what are the conditions he wants to impose? One of them is adult suffrage...has this adult suffrage any practical importance at all in a country in which three-fourths of the male population, not to talk of the womankind, lives on the verge of starvation? And for them the price of a vote is a little drink or a day’s meal...Does Mahatma Gandhi represent the Hindus of the provinces where they are in a minority? I say without hesitation he does not...

Although Parmanand was not a delegate to the next Round Table Conference, it is more than likely his views reached the Mahatma’s ears. Meanwhile, proposals to partition the Punjab were very much part of proposals that sought to safeguard the rights of both minority and majority groups.

So Sir Geoffrey Corbett, secretary of an Indian delegation to the conference, proposed a partitioned Punjab that appeared designed to address at least some Punjabi Hindu objections. Corbett’s partitioned Punjab, without Ambala division but including Simla, afforded Muslims a clear majority of 62%, Hindus about 24% and Sikhs 13%.22 Such a clear Muslim majority rendered unnecessary any reservations on their behalf. This scheme gained support among Ambala Hindus who also urged Rai Bahadur Chhotu Ram, their leader in the legislature, to agree to the proposal.

But the Sikhs resented being placed in the “position of an ineffective opposition”.23 They reiterated their demand for 30% reservation in the Punjab legislature, deemed not to be unreasonable because the Muslim minority in the United Provinces, with a corresponding population, had 31% reservation. Alternatively, they proposed a “territorial re-arrangement” that would lop off Rawalpindi and Multan divisions, excluding Lyallpur and Montgomery districts. The removed divisions could either join the NWFP or form a separate Muslim majority province. This would leave no community in the reorganised Punjab with an absolute majority and “each community would be obliged to conciliate the others”. The Sikhs’ proposed partition would make Hindus 42.3% of the Punjab; Muslims 43.3% and leave the Sikhs themselves a key 14.4% of the province. However, if this was unacceptable to the others, they preferred no change from the present constitution in the Punjab.24

Narendra Nath, the sole official representative of Punjabi Hindus in London, had a crisp rejoinder: “all partition schemes should...be shelved”.25 Lending full play to his elitist credentials, Nath stated that “due regard to efficiency” and a “minimum standard of education” were incompatible. He demanded that the services employ candidates without distinction of race or religion.26 But Nath did make a small allowance toward redressing ancient imbalances: he recommended the reservation of one-third of all jobs for those belonging to the backward classes.27 With regard to the Depressed Classes, Nath predicted that those who were now entitled to wear the brahminical thread and recite the Gayatri mantra would not want to leave the Hindu fold. However, if the Depressed Classes were granted separate representation, Hindus in Punjab and Bengal would be reduced to 14% and 18% of the population. In this case the Hindus of both provinces would claim “weightage at the highest rate allowed to Muslims in provinces in which they are in a minority”.28

Back home in Punjab, an editorial in the Tribune mused over the multiple partition proposals and opined that partitioning Punjab would be as “grave a wrong both to the province and the country as was the partition of Bengal”. Extolling “the solidarity of the Punjab”, the editorial claimed the Punjabi had become: a synonym for industry, enterprise, initiative, resourcefulness, courage and manliness. Is the Punjab going to sacrifice this eminent position both in India and in the world merely for a temporary communal adjustment? With all the strength of conviction in us we say No. By all means let the Muslims have their absolute majority in the Punjab, just as the Hindus have elsewhere. Only let them, like the Hindus in their own majority provinces, agree to do without communal representation in any form or shape. Let them enjoy their political power and authority only as Indians and let them share it fully with other communities in the only way in which political power and authority can be shared – under a scheme of joint electorates without a statutory communal majority.29

The editorial neatly captured the contradictions that afflicted most Punjabi Hindus who paused to consider the Muslim conundrum. Absolute majority for the otherwise backward community were hardly possible without adult franchise. And even the most progressive in the Hindu community appeared unwilling to countenance a statutory majority for Muslims until the introduction of universal adult franchise.

Since the many interests represented in London could not reach an agreement, the Ramsay MacDonald government announced the Communal Award of 1932, whereby it confirmed separate electorates for Muslims, Sikhs and Europeans, and
extended the privilege to Depressed Classes. Muslims were granted a statutory majority in Punjab and Bengal and weighted representation in provinces where they were a minority. The franchise was enlarged to permit between one-tenth and a quarter of the population of the country to vote with an attempt to reflect the percentages of various communities in every province. The Award could only be modified if the proposed changes had the support of all the parties concerned.30

The Communal Award’s provisions for Punjabi Hindus were sharply criticised by major commentators – Bhai Parmanand, Chhotu Ram, and Gulshan Rai – each of whom proposed different alternatives. Gulshan Rai pointed out that Hindus who were 28.7% of the population, according to the data released by the new census of 1931, had been granted 25% of seats in the future council. The Sikhs too were angry and had begun marching their jathas all over the countryside. If the Muslims and Hindus responded with Ahrar Jamaats and Mahabir and Arya Dals, then a civil war-like situation would be impossible to avert.

The only way out was to accept the solution offered by Sir Iqbal. Rai suggested that all of Rawalpindi division and most of Multan be reconstituted to form a heavily Muslim majority province. He also recommended the creation of a central Punjab province that would include the 13 districts of Montgomery, Lyallpur, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Sialkot, Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Lahore, Ferozepur, Ludhiana, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur and Kangra, districts that were home to the Sikh confederacies of the 18th century and contained the major religious places of the Sikhs. He recommended that the rest of Ambala division revert to the United Provinces of which it had been a part before 1857. Rai’s plans followed the canal irrigation projects that had been constructed by the Raj and pointed out how each newly created province would be self-sustaining and substantial. He also thought the Jats would be happy to have their own province in the east and that the Ambala Hindus had little in common with Hindus in the rest of the Punjab. Gulshan Rai concluded his proposal with the fervent appeal:31

[I]t is best for Hindus to save as much of their community as they can from the majority rule of the Muslims, by agreeing to a double partition of the Punjab, and help their brethren in the western Punjab, by claiming for them in that part of the country minority privileges.

Also recommending a partition but from a somewhat different perspective was the Unionist leader Rai Bahadur Chhotu Ram. Chhotu Ram felt MacDonald had “assumed the role of a more zealous Muslim” in giving to Muslims more seats than their own representatives had demanded. It was quite obvious the Hindus of the Punjab had been deprived of their share by the Award but for this, Chhotu Ram blamed the Hindus themselves. “They would insist on the application of one uniform formula to all the provinces of India, irrespective of the obviously different conditions prevailing in each province, before they agreed to any solution of the Punjab problem”. What sense did that make? Referring to himself as “half a Muslim”, a label maliciously deployed by his detractors, Chhotu Ram suggested he was impartial enough to propose a way out. He pointed out that Muslims who were almost 56% of the population of the Punjab had a voting strength of only 44%. Naturally, they were averse to agreeing to joint electorates pending the granting of adult suffrage. Even with the majority afforded to them by the Award, they would require the support of minorities to form a stable government. Chhotu Ram turned to the numerous partition proposals under consideration and expressed a preference for separating the bulk of Ambala division and creating a new province that would include Meerut, Agra and Rohilkhand divisions and have Delhi as its capital. If this was not acceptable, he suggested joint electorates with a slightly differential franchise.32

Shortly thereafter, Gandhi decided to contest the separate electorates that had been granted to Depressed Classes by going on a hunger fast. In the Poona Pact that followed, the number of seats for upper caste Hindus in the Punjab was further reduced. The possibility of changing the boundaries of the Punjab was again considered. B S Moonje of the Hindu Mahasabha met with Hindus of the Ambala division who were repeating their demand for a partition of the province. Moonje sought to reason with the Lahori Hindu Narendra Nath:

[W]hy not extricate the poor Hindus of the Ambala division from the yoke of the Muslim Raj and help and try to have a bulwark of the Hindu province on the Frontiers of real Hindu India against the attack of the Muslims of Punjab and wnr Province?33

The idea that Hindus alone could defend India from the inevitable incursions of Muslims from the north-west was a recurring preoccupation. But if such a “bulwark” could be guaranteed, Parmanand promised that “I and many of us who are of my way of thinking would not object to even statutory majority of Muslims.”34

As for the other outstanding issues that allegedly kept Punjabis from reaching an agreement, Parmanand, like Nath eight years earlier, invoked the principle of uniformity across India. If Muslims insisted on “spreading communalism through services” in the Punjab, then the same principle had to be established across India. And when his erstwhile friend and legal counsel, Fazl-i-Husain, wondered at the pretence of Hindus who “try to celebrate the memory of and discover Hindu leaders who had suffered at the hands of Muslim rulers”, Parmanand responded with a verse from Mirza Ghalib, comforter of many a tired soul:

Yeh kahan ki dosti hai, ki bane hain dost näsih
Koi chāhā säz hotā koi chamgusār hotā
What friendship is this when friends become preachers
If only they would soothe me, if only they would share my sorrow.

‘Is There Any Occasion for Despairing of Hindu-Muslim Unity?’

The previous section detailed a few of the myriad proposals that engaged Punjabis in the 1920s and 1930s. Many of these proposals considered redrawing provincial boundaries to meet the fears of this or the other minority community. Crucially, all Punjabi Hindus were concerned about the powers that would vest in the centre and the safeguards that would be given to minority Muslims in other provinces. The elaboration of these numerous partitionist proposals and their reasoned refutations in the press underline the fact that partition as a solution was being widely discussed in the public sphere in the Punjab. That the variously
partitioned portions of the Punjab would lie within a united India was so obvious, it did not need to be spelt out.

On the whole, the mood was upbeat, so much so that when a ramshackle proposal for a “Pakistan” appeared in the press in early 1933, it was dismissed as absurd. Over the years, the vehicle of Punjabi Hindu liberal opinion, the Tribune, never tired of pointing out the three uppermost anomalies in such schemes: (1) Pakistan would leave behind even more fragile Muslim minorities in the rest of India; (2) why would Hindus and Sikhs consent to remain minorities in the new state when it was the prospect of minoritarianism that led some Muslims towards the paradise that would be Pakistan; and (3) the British would never consent; and to such hare-brained impractical schemes that would endanger their strategic interests.36

Through the mid-1930s, the more crucial debate revolved around how to alter the Communal Award. When the Congress chose to stay neutral and neither reject nor endorse the Award, minority Hindus in the Punjab condemned its irrefutable stance. The Punjab Congress and the National Congress split; the “Nationalist” party was founded by Madan Mohan Malaviya and M S Aney, both of whom resigned from the Congress over this issue.37 However, contrary to press forecasts, the Congress did overwhelmingly well in the elections of 1937 and eventually formed ministries in all seven out of the 11 provinces in which it had won a decisive mandate.

Analysing the election verdict in the Punjab, the indefatigable Gulshan Rai pointed out that in every straight fight between the Congress and the Hindu Sabha, the Congress had won. The debacle of the Muslim League in garnering the Muslim vote was obvious: clearly, the time for “communal” or religiously-based parties was over.38 Yet a closer examination of the political creeds of the Hindu Sabha Party and the Congress in the Punjab revealed many similarities. On the question of independence, both parties were adamant.39 It was only with regard to their attitude of opposition to the Communal Award that they seemed different: even here, Jawaharlal Nehru, one of the key election campaigners in the Punjab, moved from a position of neutrality and insistence on a negotiated change to one of unilateral repudiation of the Award. Indeed, the publication of the Congress manifesto on the eve of the elections called into question the need for a separate “Nationalist” party. And at least in the Punjab, the “Nationalist” party was decisively defeated.40

Scholarship on the elections of 1937 has reflected on the absence of a coalition government between the Congress and the Muslim League, especially in the United Provinces, where the League fared well, and on the otherwise severe defeat of the League across India. Yet within the Punjab, it was obvious the Congress lacked the confidence to even contest most of the Muslim seats. Jawaharlal Nehru's pet initiative, the Muslim mass contact movement, was launched at this juncture, raising both expectations and suspicions.

Among those Punjabi Hindus wedded to an inclusive idea of India, the Congress theory of India being an amalgam of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and other communities still held good; ergo, the Muslim mass contact movement was unexceptionable.41 Yet there did seem a shift in the way these Punjabi Hindus viewed the role of the Congress. New initiatives for talks between Gandhi and Jinnah, for instance, were welcomed, but increasingly, the Congress was asked to play the role of umpire rather than enter the fray as though it were a “communal organisation”.42

However, among other Hindus such as Parmanand or visiting dignitaries such as Shankaracharya Kurtkoti, President of the Hindu Mahasabha session that met in Lahore in 1936, Hindustan was for Hindus and minority communities had to know their place. Such discourses of Hindu majoritarianism, nowadays traced to V D Savarkar's 1922 tract Hinduata, had actually not properly circulated in the Punjab public sphere until the 1930s. Even when the Shankaracharya spoke to a small audience of a few hundred Hindus in October 1936, several walked out to express their disagreement. Speculating that his views were probably “nothing more than the reaction produced on a sensitive Hindu mind by the arrogant claims of extreme Muslim communalism and the blatant talk about the Islamic belt in the North-West and Pakistan”, the Tribune editorialised that “two wrongs do not make a right” and treating Hindus and Muslims as two separate nations could only have dangerous consequences.43 To those belonging to the Hindu Mahasabha, the Tribune reiterated its commitment to continuing dialogue with Muslims and asked:

Is there any occasion for despairing of Hindu-Muslim unity? Are there not more Muslims in the national movement today than at any time in the past? The right thing for Mr Savarkar and other eminent men of his way of thinking would be to ask the Congress to concentrate its energies more and more on the Muslim mass contact movement, so that before long Muslim masses may come into line with Hindu masses.44

Almost coeval with the Congress' Muslim mass contact movement, the new Unionist Ministry led by Sir Sikander Hyat Khan held a series of Unity Conferences to arrive at a settlement of typical issues of discord between communities. However the possible success of this initiative was cut short by the announcement of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, whereby all Muslim members of the Unionist Party would join the Muslim League. By this time, the League had become associated with demands ranging from a continuation of separate electorates, to statutory majority for Muslims in the Punjab, to an endorsement of Iqbal's conception of a strong north-western Muslim majority state. Under the circumstances, it was natural that most Punjabi Hindus were wary of the Unionist-League Pact and hoped that as far as matters within the Punjab were concerned, Sikander Hyat Khan would retain autonomy of action.

This hope remained, despite Jinnah's attempts to claim sole representative status for India's Muslims in his talks with the Congress President of 1938, Subhas Chandra Bose, and despite sporadic attempts on Jinnah's part to pressure Sikander into towing the line of the all-India Muslim League. For, as so many Punjabi Hindus who wrestled with the implications of a divided India realised, the migration of millions to create homogeneous religious states or “culturally autonomous units” would simply be “folly sublimated into madness”.45 The question of population transfers, so acceptable to statesmen in Europe, was never given serious consideration in India.46
The Question of the Centre

Even on the eve of the second world war, the possibility of one or many Pakistanis was not hogging headlines. Yet schemes for redrawing boundaries continued to rear their head intermittently. One such scheme, penned by Punjab’s own Sikander, involved dividing India into seven zones. Each of these zones would consist of one or more British Indian provinces along with the princely states contiguous to them; each zone would have its own legislature, and the Federal Assembly’s powers would be strictly limited to subjects such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs, coinage and currency. All residuary powers would lie in the units, and in some cases, in the zonal legislatures. Through a complicated system of reservations, ministers in the cabinet would represent various minority communities and the princely states. Sikander clarified that his aim was to assure the princes and the zones of autonomy and non-interference, for he firmly believed that “any scheme which does not rigidly and specifically circumscribe the authority of the Centre to matters of all-India concern is not likely to work”. Keen to preserve the supremacy of the Punjab in the army, he also suggested that “In the event of a reduction or an increase in the peace-time strength of the Indian army the proportion of the various communities as on the 1st of January 1937 shall not be disturbed”.48

Sikander’s proposal was attacked on several grounds: a weak centre, the offer of immunity to the princes, and the reduced numbers of Hindus in the proposed federal assembly and cabinet were all problematic. For Gulshan Rai, Sikander’s proposal to preserve the army’s recruitment patterns intended to “keep the sword of the Punjab hanging over the heads of the rest of India to coerce the Hindu majority in the entire country”. Of 1,20,000 soldiers in the entire Indian army, 85,000 were recruited from the Punjab – a state of affairs that could only be termed “scandalous”. Would the Punjab, dominated by Muslim rule, “hold in its own hands the destinies of the whole of India?...Will the freedom of rest of India be worth anything if the defence forces of the country are to be raised only from the Muslim ridden Punjab?”49 The Punjab Tribune had long linked a strong centre with strong frontiers.51 In Rai’s interpretation of the past:

...any power which holds the territories watered by the Indus and its tributaries must very soon occupy the whole of the Gangetic region. This is illustrated by the conquests of the Persians, the Kushans, the Ghoris, and the Mughal Emperor Babur. The converse is also true. Any power that takes possession of the Gangetic basin, must soon conquer the Punjab and Sind, and after crossing the Indus advance towards the Khyber and the Hindukush. This is illustrated by the conquests of the Mauryans, the Guptas, Rajputas, Marhattas and the British. It seems the two river basins that of the Ganges and the Indus are so intimately connected with one another that the one region depends entirely on the other. One is the head and the other is the heart. Obviously...the heart cannot survive the severance of the head.52

Therefore, it was absolutely essential for India to keep a firm hold on the Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan – all territories belonging to the Indus basin. “The establishment of a separate Pakistan Government in this region, independent of the Government of India, is inconsistent with the independence of India”.53

Shortly thereafter, the second world war broke out and all hope of a Congress-League entente flew apart when Governor-General Linlithgow made it apparent he would give Jinnah a wide berth to forestall negotiations with the Congress. Jinnah responded with breathtaking confidence that the Muslims were a nation and entitled therefore to their own territory. The Lahore resolution of 23 March 1940, later dubbed the Pakistan resolution, would go down in history books as a turning point.54

Torn between dismissing the severely articulated demands for Muslim belts/zones/states and taking these demands seriously, Punjabi Hindus gradually echoed the Mahasabha viewpoint that negotiations with the Muslim League were a mistake. In veering to the right, they were aided by Gandhi’s reaction to the Lahore resolution. While Punjab’s minorities focused on their rights and acknowledged the presence of a central government and federal court to which they could appeal in the present dispensation, the League’s scheme, they predicted, would leave them “no choice except to appeal to the neighbouring autonomous and sovereign States in which their coreligionists are in the seat of authority; and this appeal will inevitably lead to tangles like those one has recently witnessed in Europe, in which the ultimate arbiter will be the sword”.55 Gandhi, on the other hand, focused on the all-India minority, the Muslim community, and suggested that “…any Muslim demand made by the Muslim delegates will be irresistible”. The Tribune quickly moved to resist the implications of his offer:

...it is not true, because a separate communal vote in this matter, whether on the part of Muslims or any other community, will not and cannot be decisive. If the Indian nation is an indivisible unity, as all true nationalists hold that it is, then the only decisive vote in this matter must be the joint vote of all communities by means of joint electorates.56

And when a few days later, Gandhi claimed: “We are at present a joint family. Any member can claim a division”, the Tribune retorted:

Once you admit the right of any community to dictate its own terms, that community automatically becomes the master of the situation and, when there are 20 such communities the result can be nothing else except general chaos, confusion and anarchy... Is it for nothing that the us though they were territorial entities and not communities … took a vow of “perpetual union”? Is it for nothing that they actually fought a desperate civil war rather than concede the right of the southern States to secede?57

The example of the us was repeatedly invoked to make the point that on the unity of India, too, there could be no compromise. Small wonder then that when the erstwhile premier of Madras Presidency, C Rajagopalachari, sought to accept the principle on which the demand for Pakistan was based, several of Punjab’s minorities were appalled. Referring to Rajaji as an “appeaser”, the insult of the age, the Tribune thought accepting the League’s demand for separation was the same as agreeing to the establishment of Pakistan.58 In sharp contrast to the earlier view that British rule had united India, this paper now held:

A nation is an indissoluble union: its unity is the result of growth and not of a pact. The elements which comprise a nation can no more have
the right of secession from it than the parts of a living organism can have in relation to the organism itself. In India political unity is not to be created; it is there already, it has been there for centuries. The argument that the political unity of a territorial area can only be maintained through the consent of its constituent elements can only apply to those areas in which some elements are seeking to come together when they are actually scattered. India is not such an area.59

The more the Muslim League rallied Muslims around a vaguely defined Pakistan, the more Punjabi Hindus insisted India was indivisible. What also disturbed Punjab's non-Muslims was Jinnah's assertion that only Muslims would have the right of self-determination. To that limited extent, Sir Sikander's new formula, circulated just weeks before his untimely death, offered some solace, in that it allowed Hindus and Sikhs the right of self-determination as well. However, the desire for a free and united Punjab, part of a free and united and strong-centred India, remained the only seriously acceptable goal for Punjab's Hindus.60

In the build-up to independence, the elections of 1946 played a key role. In the Punjab especially, the elections were viewed on the one-point agenda of creating Pakistan. Punjab's Hindus responded by first claiming that the Muslim League represented only a small section of India's Muslim population. When it became apparent that the League's potent slogan – Pakistan leke rahenge (we will insist on Pakistan) – was winning adherents, and the Khizr Hyat Khan-led Unionist Party felt compelled to support the demand for Pakistan, Punjabi Hindus emphasised that the two Pakistanns, upheld by the League and the Unionists respectively, differed from each other in crucial respects.61 The Hindus also decided to fight the elections cohesively, unlike never before: a Hindu Mahasabhaite such as Gokul Chand Narang withdrew from the contest on the Congressman Diwan Chaman Lall's promise that the Congress would not countenance any demand for Pakistan or parity at the new centre-to-be.62 When the election results finally showed that the League had made a clean sweep of the Muslim seats in the Punjab and the Unionist Party had suffered a miserable rout, most Punjabi Hindus focused on how the election results could not be read as a referendum on the Pakistan issue. What was of paramount importance now was to prevent the vivisectionist Leaguers from forming a government in the province.63

So a Congress-Unionist-Akali coalition government came to power with the singular goal of keeping the recently victorious Muslim League out of power in the Punjab. Meanwhile in Delhi, three delegates representing the British Cabinet arrived to help hammer out an agreement that would enable the British to “transfer power” to Indian hands. Given the League's demand for Pakistan and the Congress' insistence on one federation, the Cabinet Mission had a tough task cut out for itself. Yet it managed to put forward a plan that was acceptable to both major political parties. The real dissenters to the plan were Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs and Bengali Hindus.

Briefly, the Cabinet Mission Plan suggested that “Provinces should be free to form Groups” to decide on certain common subjects. The Union Centre would embrace both British India and the Princely States and deal with only three subjects – foreign affairs, defence and communications. But the centre would be able to raise finances for the above subjects and residuary powers would lie in the provinces.64 When it became apparent that provinces would compulsorily have to join groups, at least pending elections under the new constitution, minorities in Punjab and Bengal rejected the plan.

If the Lucknow pact proved to be a Siwalikian error and the Congress attitude towards the Communal Award a Vindhyachalian mistake, the All India Congress Committee’s resolution on the British government's statement of 6 December 1946 (accepting that provinces would have to join Groups) might prove to be a Himalayan blunder.65

The only way to avoid a Partition of India was now firmly closed.

Towards a Conclusion

This essay has related some of the numerous proposals to “partition” the Punjab and reconfigure the territory of India to debates revolving around the protection of “minority rights”. It becomes apparent that through the 1920s and 1930s, Punjab's Hindus and Sikhs wished to have a say in the governance of their Muslim majority province and they used partition as a device to record, in turn, their strategic, numerical, economic, and political importance. In the best of worlds, they preferred a united Punjab with safeguards akin to those enjoyed by Muslim minorities in the rest of India. The very marginal majority of Muslims in the Punjab, however, gravitated against allowing safeguards to Hindus and Sikhs, both favourably placed communities within the province; safeguards, some of which would only be deployed for backward and Depressed Classes in the new India.

I have alluded to the twists and turns in the relationship between the Congress and Hindu Subhaites in the Punjab here.66 At key moments from the 1920s onwards, Punjabi Hindus belonging to the Hindu Sabha and the Congress asserted their reluctance to be governed by a statutory Muslim majority in the Punjab and proposed various partitions of the province. However, the Congress' decision to partition the Punjab and Bengal was unilateral. There was no anticipated “joint vote of all communities by means of joint electorates”67. Only the formal resolution of the Punjab Congress recorded how closely tied the decision had been, in words and affect, if not in votes: “...in the interest of the unity of this country this committee demands that power be transferred to a strong centre government [sic]. This committee while believing in the unity of the Punjab is of the opinion that the unity of India is more fundamental and necessary”.68

The burden of the Punjab Congress resolution rested on one word: more. The unity of India was more necessary than the unity of the Punjab. The implications of such short-sightedness only became clear in the following decades.

NOTES AND REFERENCES


2 For a critique of the old historiography, see Pandey, Gyanendra (2001): Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). The new subaltern turn has also produced some

These details, and a part of the argument that follows, are elaborated in Neeti Nair (2011): *Changing Homelands: Hindu Politics and the Partition of India* (Delhi: Permanent Black and Cambridge: Harvard University Press).


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See also unsigned articles in the editorial columns in the issues of the *Tribune*, 1 and 3 May 1933; 7 January 1940, 10 May 1940, 6 March and 22 July 1941, 27 April 1942, 7 April 1945, 10 January 1946.


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